Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia's invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to October 31

[Emrys]

13. "GOOD Du'ers don't propagandize other DU'ers"

Did Boris Johnson really sabotage peace talks between Russia and Ukraine? The reality is more complicated

A recent study shows the reasons the 2022 talks failed are more nuanced than critics suggest. Compromise may still be possible

The war in Ukraine will be a source of fascination and study for historians for decades to come. Even today, two years in, we’re starting to see research into some of the big moments that characterised the early days of the conflict, and which sheds light on the confusing welter of news stories that emerged at the time. Military analysts, for example, have already been able to reconstruct some of the most critical battles of the war’s early days, showing how contingent and critical Russia’s failure to establish a beachhead at Hostomel airport near Kyiv was to the course of the war, when history could easily have gone down a different path.

Another study, published last week by the historian Sergey Radchenko and the political scientist Samuel Charap, focuses on the poorly understood but consequential peace negotiations that played out between Russia and Ukraine in the spring of 2022 over ending the conflict. These negotiations – held predominantly in Istanbul – have become a focus for critics of the war in the US, who often argue that the west, and particularly then British prime minister, Boris Johnson, sabotaged these negotiations and prevented a successful ceasefire. Vladimir Putin would go on to make a similar argument in his now infamous interview with Tucker Carlson.

As Charap and Radchenko show, the reality is a bit more complicated. Johnson didn’t directly sabotage a ceasefire deal in spring 2022; indeed, there was no deal ready to be signed between Russia and Ukraine. The two sides hadn’t agreed on territorial issues, or on levels of military armaments permitted after the war. Ukraine’s position during the negotiations necessitated security guarantees that western states were hesitant to provide. And there were domestic political questions inside Ukraine related to Russian demands about “denazification” to contend with.

At the same time, the article shows that many of the opposing narratives – that neither Ukraine nor Russia are willing to negotiate, or that Ukraine’s Nato membership isn’t important to Russia – are also false. The two sides were able to agree on some major concessions, mostly around the question of the postwar European security order, and they were willing to talk, even in the face of a brutal ongoing war. And although there are other reasons why the talks failed, the promise of western commitments undoubtedly did play a role in undermining the Ukrainian willingness to come to an agreement at that time.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/apr/22/boris-johnson-ukraine-2022-peace-talks-russia

DISINFO: Boris Johnson called on Kyiv not to sign any peace deal with Russia and just fight

A recurring disinformation narrative in pro-Kremlin outlets claiming that Ukraine and its allies are not interested in peace.
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This narrative distorts an interview with Davit Arakhamia, the chairman of the parliamentary faction of the ruling party of Ukraine. In the interview, Arakhamia himself denied that the Ukrainian delegation was ready to sign the document and that Boris Johnson allegedly stopped them.

Based on Arakhamia’s statements, Western partners were kept informed about the negotiations and had access to the draft versions of the agreement. However, they did not make decisions for Ukraine but could only offer advice. Arakhamia clarified in his interview that Ukraine had already decided not to sign the document even before receiving advice from Boris Johnson. Read the full debunk of the story at Myth Detector.

Putin and the Kremlin have a track record of pretending negotiations which are, in fact, just blunt demands for Ukrainian unconditional surrender. We have analysed this disinfo tactic in several articles, especially: "Prepare for winter" (30 Nov. 2023), "Russian so-called ‘peace proposals’ are empty PR stunts" (18 Jan. 2023) , "What He Said and What it Really Means – Vol. 2: “Negotiations” (1. March 2022) and "The Kremlin security demands" (21 Dec. 2021).

https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/boris-johnson-called-on-kyiv-not-to-sign-any-peace-deal-with-russia-and-just-fight/

H-Diplo | RJISSF Commentary III-1: Did Boris Johnson Prevent an Early End to the War in Ukraine?

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In an October 2022 analysis, Taras Fedirko, a Ukrainian academic at the University of Glasgow in Scotland, contended that the West didn’t “halt” Ukraine’s peace negotiations with Russia. Instead, Russia’s fundamental unreliability to honor its security commitments made such talks futile in the first place. Moscow, after all, had been reluctant to uphold its commitments to peace agreements since the Minsk Accords, a series of international treaties designed to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014.These accords, which were originally intended to cease hostilities and promote political reconciliation between Ukraine and its separatist regions, were exploited by Russia. Instead of fostering peace, they served as a diplomatic pretext for Russia’s control over parts of the Donbas, setting the stage for a full-scale invasion eight years later.

Fedirko maintains that it may well be correct that Johnson advised Zelensky that the West was not prepared to negotiate with Russia. Still, it was ultimately Russia’s lack of credibility that led to the failure of any agreement on a cease fire. Johnson’s advice, Fedirko is convinced, was simply not all that important.
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... David Hendrickson posits that Johnson’s visit to Ukraine in April 2022 was more about confirming the Ukrainian leader’s thinking that any peace arrangement would be deeply unreliable rather than urging him to exercise restraint. According to Hendrickson, the Ukrainian government, in step with most Western governments, sought to avoid any negotiated settlement with Russia that could be perceived as advantageous to Russia. As a result, the Ukrainian politicians were not inclined to enter into any deal with Russia and were eager for assurances of continued unwavering Western support. They were happy that Johnson gave them these assurances during his April 10 visit.

These arguments presented by Fedirko, Ashford, and Hendrickson offer valuable perspectives to broaden the scope of the narratives around the failed peace talks. They do not conclusively prove that Johnson did not convey a “no peace deal” message to Ukraine. In fact, they tend to confirm that Johnson did deliver such a message but argue that his message was relatively inconsequential regarding the development that ultimately led to the breakdown of peace negotiations. While the counterarguments concede that the West played a role in the failure of peace negotiations, the main debate focuses on the extent of this involvement. Given that Western arms support has been Ukraine’s lifeline in this war, and that the West would still be the primary security guarantor if a peace deal with Russia were reached, there is ample reason to suspect that Johnson’s assurances of continued support for Ukraine, if Zelensky were to turn down a peace arrangement with Moscow, were welcomed with relief in Kyiv.

https://issforum.org/commentary/h-diplo-rjissf-commentary-iii-1-did-boris-johnson-prevent-an-early-end-to-the-war-in-ukraine