How Analytical Models Failed Clinton [View all]
It was well known that traditional polling was having problems. The numbing effect of billions of telemarketing calls and the advent of caller ID and voice mail had reduced response rates (the percentage of completed interviews for every hundred attempts) from the 40s a couple of decades ago to the high single digits. As they struggled to get truly representative samples, pollsters weighted their data more than ever before, making assumptions of what the electorate would look like on election days that were weeks, months, or even a year or more away.
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The reliance, or perhaps overreliance on analytics, may be one of the factors contributing to Clintons surprise defeat. The Clinton team was so confident in its analytical models that it opted not to conduct tracking polls in a number of states during the last month of the campaign. As a consequence, deteriorating support in states such as Michigan and Wisconsin fell below the radar screen, slippage that that traditional tracking polls would have certainly caught.
According to Kantar Media/CMAG data, the Clinton campaign did not go on the air with television ads in Wisconsin until the weeks of Oct. 25 and Nov. 1, spending in the end just $2.6 million. Super PACs backing Clinton didnt air ads in Wisconsin until the last week of the campaign. In Michigan, aside from a tiny $16,000 buy by the campaign and a party committee the week of Oct. 25, the Clinton campaign and its allied groups didnt conduct a concerted advertising effort until a week before the election.
In fact, the Clinton campaign spent more money on television advertising in Arizona, Georgia, and the Omaha, Nebraska markets than in Michigan and Wisconsin combined. It was Michigan and Wisconsin, along with Pennsylvania (the Clinton campaign and allied groups did spend $42 million on television in the Keystone State), that effectively cost Democrats the presidency.
http://cookpolitical.com/story/10205