In seeking to contain the power struggle, Khamenei used Rafsanjani, the powerful figure the Guards had worked for so many years to defeat, as a sacrificial offering. He would allow the Guards to disqualify Rafsanjani from running, and in return the Guards consented to allowing Hassan Rouhani, a conservative, loyal, and “moderate” cleric, to run instead. The popular vote would once again be allowed to play the role of arbitrator in this competition between factions of the elite, a tradition whose abandonment in 2009 had created one of the largest crises in the history of the Islamic Republic. Knowing that he himself was unpopular as a result of his unqualified support for the Guards in 2009 and viewed by many as the face of the dictatorship, Khamenei took great care not to appear as a supporter of Rouhani.
....Although Rouhani enjoys the support of Khamenei and part of the intelligence community (due to his longtime membership in the Supreme National Security Council), it is not clear that he will prevail in the coming power struggle. The next few key battles with the Guards over Cabinet selection will be revealing. If Rouhani could take away from the Guards the ministries of justice, intelligence, interior, and economy and appoint people who might actually succeed in cleansing these agencies of the IRGC influence, then he has a realistic chance of success in bringing the clergy back to power. But the history of authoritarian regimes does not offer much cause for optimism. Once they attain power, armed forces usually do not leave their position of power and privilege unless confronted with a sweeping revolution or a humiliating defeat in a war.
The armed and dangerous genie, fattened by the power and privilege it has enjoyed in the domestic realm, does not easily return to the bottle.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/tensions-tehran-iran%E2%80%99s-mullahs-vs-revolutionary-guardsI don't think there are many bazaris who, if allowed to converse anonymously and without reprisals, would argue with the notion that they had MORE clout under Shah--and they supported Khomeini precisely because they didn't feel their bloc had enough influence.
And as for Rouhani, the fact that he's had a couple of good days in NYC, and there's a hope in hell of sanctions being lifted, will go a long way towards insulating him. That said, he's got to watch his back. He may want to get a food taster, too...
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